

# RASKIN PROGRAM: A PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS

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**Abstract** - The crisis in Indonesia has had a major impact on poverty over the last 20 years. Rising food prices have contributed to this situation. Indonesian government develops several economic recovery strategies, including the RASKIN program, as rice has a strategic role in achieving food, economic and political security. This paper aims to analyze how rice should be distributed to the poor through the RASKIN program. This program was a change from the initial program of OPM and OPK. Some improvements have been made to reduce the poverty level in Indonesia, but the desired objectives can be said to have not been achieved entirely. The source of the problem was the occurrence of discrepancies between concepts and their implementation. Abuse of the RASKIN program mainly takes place in relation to the distribution and determination aspects of the target household.

**Index Terms:** raskin program, rice distribution, poverty, public policy

## I. INTRODUCTION

The crisis in Indonesia has had a major impact on poverty over the last 20 years. The number of poor (who those without access to basic food and non-food needs) increased to 30% (30-40 million people) and the poverty rate increased by 15% in 1998. This poverty rate deepens with the occurrence of natural disasters (earthquake disaster in some parts of Indonesia such as Tsunami in Aceh and North Sumatera). According to ADB's calculations, Indonesia's poor population reached 111 million people in 2005. Rising food prices have aggravated the situation. Therefore, the government made some economic recovery strategies, including policies in the form of rice assistance for the poor through the RASKIN program. The main consideration is that rice is one of the food ingredients that have a strategic role in achieving food security, economic resilience and political stability.

Through this program, the government provides compensation (subsidies) in the form of rice with cheap and affordable price to the poor. This reflects the government's concern about the socio-economic impact of the prolonged crisis. The government's concern is primarily targeted to a group of people experiencing a decline in purchasing power over food due to price increases. The allocation of government funds for rice procurement in the RASKIN program continues to be improved. However, this program implementation faces many problems so that need to be evaluated.

This paper aims to analyze how rice should be distributed to the poor through the RASKIN program. If the program implementation has not reached its target, what are the causes? How to solve it?

## II. SOCIAL PROTECTION POLICY THROUGH RICE SUBSIDY PROGRAM

Indonesian government has enacted social protection or social safety net (JPS = Jaring Pengaman Sosial), a special welfare assistance program. One of them was the distribution of medium quality rice at subsidized prices for poor households. The program was actually a government policy taken hastily in mid-1998 during the economic crisis.

JPS program covers various forms such as job creation, education and health assistance, block grants and microcredit. However, some of these programs are only short-term programs that are gradually discontinued.

From year to year, the implementation of the subsidized rice program for the poor as a national program becomes very important, despite the many challenges associated with rice availability and prices. In fact, there are many factors affecting rice prices in Indonesia, such as rice prices in foreign markets. The occurrence of domestic rice scarcity resulted in domestic rice prices increasing 2.5 times compared to rice prices in mid 1997. The enforcement of government policies on fuel price increase, basic electricity tariff (TDL = tarif dasar listrik) and telephone, also affect the price rice. Government responded to this situation by providing fuel compensation funds by distributing rice for the poor and delaying the increase in telephone charges. In the meantime, exchange rate instability has disrupted the stabilization performance of domestic rice prices. Decline in the rupiah exchange rate has resulted in rising domestic rice prices, which had continued since November 1997 to September 1998. The price of rice may decline after the rupiah appreciates to around IDR 8,000 per US\$. Furthermore, the price of rice is relatively stable around IDR 2,750 per kg.

Given the importance of establishing food security, food availability is also important. To make it happen, government conducted a Pure Market Operation (OPM = Operasi Pasar Murni) by selling rice at a price level of 10-15% below market price. OPM is considered an important instrument in controlling rice prices, where the price of rice should not exceed the ceiling price and floor price. However, this actually increases the number of poor people because the rice is being bought by big traders or upper

middle class, so the government stop this program. This situation by Sawit (2000) is considered an indication that the government wants to enact a policy of subsidizing rice to the general consumer, because through the OPM policy, upper middle consumers actually enjoy more subsidies than middle-low consumers.

Furthermore, the government replaced the OPM program with a new policy aimed at transferring its income to the poor in the form of rice. The new policy is targeted price subsidy, known as Special Market Operation (OPK = Operasi Pasar Khusus) and enforced starting July 1998. Initially, the Ministry of Food and BULOG (Badan Urusan Logistik) cooperated to distribute rice. However, after the government restructured its cabinet (after the 1996 General Election), where the Ministry of Food was dissolved, only BULOG (from the central level, DOLOG, Sub-DOLOG to KANLOG) were fully responsible for OPK implementation.

In this policy, poor families who are vulnerable to food are given cheap rice rations at a price of IDR 1,000 per kg. The rice was not distributed through the free market because it was not intended for stability, but directly distributed to villages or areas of poor households. Every poor household got 20 kg of rice per month. The amount of rice were calculated 40% of the total requirement assuming rice consumption per capita was 10 kg with 5 members per household. The role of OPK in its development was more dominant than OPM.

The change of OPM to OPK (which since 2002 turned into RASKIN) was expected to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of RASKIN program. There were improvements in targeting methods from the geographic targeting approach to the self targeting mechanism approach. Other efforts are transparency in every operation of BULOG and to reduce the conflict of interest it was involved independent party in evaluating BULOG.

In addition to RASKIN, the government was also implementing the Fuel Oil Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program (PKPS-BBM = Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak) for Food Sector, where its beneficiaries were the partial of the RASKIN program beneficiaries. PKPS-BBM on Food Section was part of RASKIN Program. Basically, mechanism of PKPS-BBM in distributing food was not different with RASKIN, but its administration from the beginning must be separated from RASKIN program. In its implementation, RASKIN and PKPS-BBM programs involve various related institutions, so that in order to facilitate the operation of each agency, it is necessary to prepare the Implementation Guidance which will become the reference of RASKIN implementation. To ensure the smooth and accurate achievement of overall RASKIN implementation objectives and to accommodate specific technical matters, the Governors/Regents/Mayors of each region should issue Technical Guidelines.

The objectives of RASKIN and PKPS-BBM for Food Sector were 1) to provide food aid/rice to poor families in order to overcome the problem of their macro malnutrition, 2) to fulfill the basic food needs of poor families as an effort to increase food security at household level. This was done through the sale of rice at a subsidized price with a predetermined amount.

Target of RASKIN and PKPS-BBM for Food Sector was the assistance and opening of poor families' access to basic food/rice at subsidized price in the places and amounts that have been determined so as to help improve the welfare/food security at the household level.

### III. IMPLEMENTATION OF RICE SUBSIDY POLICY FOR THE POOR

The policy of subsidizing rice for the poor is done by the government to help the poorest people and food insecurity so they can still get rice for their household needs. Since July 1998, rice aid policy to target household groups has been known as OPM. This fact is one indication that the government wants to increase rice price subsidy policy to the general consumer, where upper middle consumers enjoy more subsidized rice, because they are able to access it in the market.

While the policy of subsidizing rice for general consumers was diminishing, OPK's role in market operations increased from 11% (in August 1998) to 69% in February 1998. Since November 1999, the government has ceased to implement OPM. This means that the OPK program was designed to correct OPM policies. One of the revenue transfer targets was poor households, so this policy can strengthen household food security of the poor and improve their purchasing power.

Initially, OPK was only able to distribute rice to poor families, weighing 10 kg / month with the price of IDR 10.000,00 where the beneficiaries were categorized based on the socio-economic status classification of BKKBN. The indicators used were consumption patterns, types of the health facilities used, the number and variety of clothing owned, the quality of their house and the observance of worship ([http://www.bulog.co.id/sekilas\\_raskin.php](http://www.bulog.co.id/sekilas_raskin.php)).

In mid-2001, several staff at BULOG began to see that there were weaknesses in the OPK program that caused problems to be addressed seriously. It was revealed through a number of independent studies indicating the OPK program failed to achieve its objectives. The disadvantages stem from administrative procedures and their implementation. This implies that many of the poorest families were left untouched by the program. Furthermore, RASKIN recipient criteria were reconsidered by incorporating local elements in the targeting process. BKKBN is appointed as the determinant of RASKIN recipient criteria. This institution classifies the poor into Prosperous Family (KPS) and Prosperous Family-1 (KS-1). Based on economic reasons (Alek), these two classifications are now called KPS Alek and KS-1 Alek.

Based on suggestions from interested parties in a series of discussions, the program revised in 2002, from OPK to RASKIN. In the opinion of the villagers, OPK is more perceived as sembako (nine basic commodities) that the government distributes to the community, where the program seems mechanistic.

RASKIN, as the new program put more emphasis on the information aspect, to show that cheap rice is only for poor households. Targeted food subsidy policy is also intended as an "income transfer" policy for poor households. Currently, the RASKIN program was no longer considered an emergency program, but as a social protection program. The target group was not different with the OPK program, which is poor households and is threatened with not being able to provide enough food security. Data on poor households and food insecurity were collected from various sources such as BKKBN, Kelurahan, NGOs, BPS, in

accordance with predetermined criteria. The data were then examined for the truth, after which it was corrected if there was an error. Subsequently, through the village meeting, the local Village Head will establish the RASKIN recipient household, to be approved by head of district.

Although RASKIN recipient households have been established through village consultation and authorized by head of district. In fact, in some RASKIN receiving locations, the data still had to be compromised with the local community (Table 1). There was a difference in the target, resulting in a decrease in the amount of rice per household. This fact shows that the distribution of rice has undergone negotiation process within the community. It has been done because 1) the majority of the community (in the village concerned) feels entitled to get RASKIN's allotment, 2) the effort to reduce the occurrence of conflict in society rising from social jealousy.

Table 1. RASKIN in some Villages in Bengkulu and Karawang

Location	Allocations per village (kg)	Households Total	Target beneficiaries	Actual beneficiaries	Allocations per household (kg)
Regency Bengkulu Utara					
Village A	1400	132	70	90*	1-18
Village B	400	33	20	33	12
Village C	3100	745	155	310	10
Regency Bengkulu Selatan					
Kelurahan D	750-2000	230	88	160*	4
Village E	1000-2000				10 or 15
Village F	1000-1200	1023	205	1000*	4
Village G	4000	574	50	120*	8
Village H	1000	174	50	125*	8-15
Regency Karawang					
Village I	15,720	3500	786	+/- 1800	8
Village J	42,900	3956	2145	3500*	8-12

Source : Hastuti et.al. 2003.

Note : (\*) These numbers require further verification

Suryahadi et al. (2003), indicating that 9 out of 10 villages that were the location of the study determine the recipient household RASKIN not in accordance with the BKKBN provisions. In addition, in other locations there is also a tendency that although rice was distributed to communities larger than targeted, there remains an effort to re-identify the households that were most likely to receive RASKIN.

The latter case occurs in Kepulauan Seribu District Administration (Astuty et al., 2003) (Table 2), for example Kelurahan Pulau Panggang. RASKIN's share was distributed to 506 households (HH) in rotation. This amount was 7.4 times greater than the HH which has been designated as the beneficiary (68 HHs). As a result, each household in this region receives only 16 kg of subsidized rice every 2 or 3 months. A similar case also occurred in Coconut Island where the RASKIN receiving household increased from 148 to 702 HH (almost 4 times) with the acquisition of 5 kg of rice per 1 or 3 months. Similarly, in Harapan Island Village, there was an increase of 8.3 times (from 47 to 391 HH) so that each HH only received 3 liters (2.4 kg) of rice every month. Emalia (2013) also found that the implementation of raskin program in 3 sub-districts in Bandar Lampung City was appropriate in all aspects of assessment, except on the accuracy of the amount due to the addition of raskin from 13 kg/HH to 15 kg/HH.

The above conditions occur because the BKKBN data does not reflect the actual state of the population (never revised). Thus, it was clear that the "necessity" to confirm data from BKKBN (through village assemblies) with village officials to be endorsed by the local Sub-district Head (as stated in the operational guidelines) was never done.

Table 2. RASKIN in Regency of Kepulauan Seribu

Location	Allocations per village (kg)	Households Total	Target beneficiaries	Actual beneficiaries	Allocations per household (kg)
			(a)	(b)	(c)
1. Panggang Island	1.360	1.220	68	506*	16
2. Kelapa Island	3.960	1.350	198	792*	5
3. Harapan Island	940	493	47	391	2,4
4. Untung Jawa Island	1.980	352	99	198	10
5. Tidung Island	3.920	992	196	196	20
6. Pari Island	1.380	498	69	520*	20

Source : Astuty et al., 2003, processed

Note : (\*) People who receive raskin every two or three months in rotation

In addition, the unrealistic number of HHs eligible to receive under actual conditions also had to do with the livelihoods of local people who are mostly farmers or fishermen. The seawater season is a famine for fishermen, at which time their purchasing power is very low and entitled to receive RASKIN's share. In this case, the target group on a seasonal basis had not been included in the category of HH entitled to benefit.

Interesting phenomenon in three research sites (Kepulauan Seribu, Bengkulu and Karawang) indicates that the community actually wants RASKIN to be distributed equally to the community, including non-poor households. People want to get RASKIN's share, even if they were not eligible to receive it.

#### IV. RASKIN DISTRIBUTION AND PAYMENT PROCEDURES

Distribution of rice to the established households is the government's effort to increase food security and provide protection to poor households, by channeling a maximum of 20 kg of rice/HH/month, at a price of IDR 1000/kg at the distribution point. The distribution point in this case is the "agreed place" (except the BULOG warehouse) between the local government (Regent/Mayor/Subdistrict /Village Head) and DOLOG/Sub DOLOG/KANLOG as a place to hand over rice by SATGAS RASKIN to the distributors (this is the Village Head who is assisted by his subordinates/community representatives if required).

Implementation of RASKIN distribution is based on proposing Head of Village through District and District to Head of DOLOG or Sub-DOLOG to obtain Delivery Order (DO). Based on the DO, the rice distribution is done by the RASKIN Task Force from the warehouse to the distribution point. The distribution can only be done after the village or sub-district eligible to obtain RASKIN has paid the previous distribution payment. Generally, distribution is only done once every month unless there are certain cases, ie pending payments or on local government policies.

The government has transferred IDR 1.1 trillion for the poor. Sawit (1999) reported that this poor group's fiscal multiplier had reached 1.9. That is, increasing their purchasing power will increase GDP about IDR 2.9 trillion and total benefits reached by IDR 3.4 trillion. This program has managed to halt the decline in energy consumption and protein of poor households by 8% and 16% respectively.

Table 3. Distribution of OPK and RASKIN 1998/1999-2002

No.	Province	OPK (ton)				Raskin & PKS-BBM				
		1998/1999	1999/2000	2000	2001	Allocation (ton)	Distribution (ton)	Target of HH	KPS ALEK	KS-1 ALEK
1.	Aceh Darussalam	17,148	79,943	48,596	58,793	77,977	85,569	324,070	237,059	213,891
2.	Sumatera Utara	8,552	46,121	26,092	31,933	40,310	32,224	167,958	184,886	394,293
3.	Riau	9,354	35,315	20,086	24,472	33,856	26,573	141,069	76,632	157,460
4.	Sumatera Barat	1,417	18,289	11,672	17,975	24,789	25,470	103,286	16,307	117,442
5.	Bangka Belitung	-	-	-	-	6,441	7,641	26,838	-	-
6.	Bengkulu	5,695	13,523	9,770	17,411	23,315	25,612	97,147	44,541	85,979
7.	Jambi	7,758	22,399	10,562	14,774	20,426	214,434	85,109	118,203	11,067
8.	Lampung	65,590	122,501	64,969	72,324	114,139	125,585	475,579	429,916	297,011
9.	DKI Jakarta	6,804	18,172	12,915	20,559	28,278	24,258	1,147,825	11,794	116,157
10.	Jawa Barat	115,976	435,145	197,200	233,026	270,867	266,522	1,128,613	1,100,809	1,823,309
11.	Banten	-	-	-	-	44,348	53,691	184,783	-	-
12.	Jawa Tengah	367,383	706,206	357,946	325,658	498,007	498,006	2,075,031	1,934,757	710,172
13.	D.I.Yogyakarta	16,082	41,350	21,144	31,829	43,385	43,485	180,770	128,052	143,764
14.	Jawa Timur	299,006	579,827	277,134	250,305	428,763	424,619	1,786,511	1,799,518	933,541
15.	Kalimantan Barat	4,364	30,772	18,856	25,184	30,431	30,364	126,797	9,990	188,822
16.	Kalimantan Timur	1,521	14,453	7,766	12,956	17,599	21,590	73,331	35,677	93,016
17.	Kalimantan Selatan	4,160	31,310	17,917	24,893	34,187	36,013	142,444	50,955	146,350
18.	Kalimantan Tengah	3,934	12,492	10,075	13,575	19,969	22,079	83,206	43,897	88,056
19.	Kalimantan Utara	8,673	42,449	16,509	24,087	18,224	20,206	75,933	73,296	69,471
20.	Sulawesi Utara	8,673	42,449	16,509	24,087	18,224	20,206	75,933	73,296	69,471
21.	Gorontalo	-	-	-	-	11,660	13,116	48,852	-	-
22.	Sulawesi Tengah	3,764	21,070	16,376	28,521	30,604	34,559	127,516	128,116	90,648
23.	Sulawesi Tenggara	4,921	18,969	23,699	19,323	19,902	22,438	82,925	87,537	114,390
24.	Sulawesi Selatan	10,146	69,432	28,235	32,858	40,370	44,634	168,207	191,868	335,171
25.	Bali	691	7,015	6,453	7,236	11,003	12,922	45,844	37,896	56,030
26.	NTB	25,549	68,836	39,170	42,442	65,784	72,731	274,099	312,236	244,175
27.	NTT	15,674	44,970	40,191	47,374	84,355	92,828	351,481	585,538	-
28.	Maluku (Ambon)	3,745	8,907	18,429	31,630	21,609	28,928	90,038	135,605	69,578
29.	Maluku Utara	-	-	-	-	10,020	7,702	41,750	-	-
30.	Papua	8,429	35,853	31,135	30,574	38,596	42,141	160,816	236,400	92,181
31.	Timor Timur	7,124	6,947	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total (ton)	1,050,374	1,353,248	1,353,248	1,481,289	2,167,100	2,226,847	9,029,584	8,260,327	6,889,844

Source: Bulog, 2003

Description: the realization of the OPK distribution in 2000 is only done for 9 months, while the other year done for 12 months. The number of Raskin programs in 2002 was entirely the allocation of Bulog itself for 12 months.

This policy was considered quite successful when compared with other JPS programs. However, the results of Suryahadi and Sumarto's (2003) research indicate that there are abuses of the OPK program and the inaccuracy of selection of target households. This is a management weakness and not a concept weakness. Table 3 illustrates the "OPK" program and the "RASKIN" program in Indonesia until 2002. It is clear that throughout the province there is an increase in the amount of rice allocated from year to year. A

very significant increase occurred from 1998/1999 to 1999/2000. This means that over the period, more and more Indonesians are poor, so the need for RASKIN continues to increase.

Table 4. RASKIN Allocation and Compensation Program Reduced subsidy-fuel oil (PKS-BBM), Per Province in Indonesia, 2004

No.	Province	Raskin (ton)	PKS-BBM (ton)	Total (ton)
1.	Nanggro Aceh D.	94.186	5.814	100.000
2.	Sumatera Utara	43.907	7.348	51.255
3.	Riau	27.652	3.019	30.671
4.	Sumatera Barat	21.559	1.737	23.296
5.	Jambi	19.819	1.778	21.597
6.	Sumatera Selatan	56.678	7.208	63.886
7.	Bangka Belitung	10.448	512	11.000
8.	Bengkulu	20.443	1.500	21.943
9.	Lampung	107.624	9.641	117.265
10.	DKI Jakarta	26.679	1.599	28.278
11.	Jawa Barat	238.364	32.503	270.876
12.	Banten	47.841	6.062	53.903
13.	Jawa Tengah	328.279	34.035	362.341
14.	D.I.Yogyakarta	37.640	2.974	40.614
15.	Jawa Timur	310.461	35.559	364.020
16.	Kalimantan Timur	22.183	1.626	23.809
17.	Kalimantan Barat	26.241	2.515	28.756
18.	Kalimantan Selatan	32.733	2.396	35.129
19.	Kalimantan Tengah	19.065	1.703	20.768
20.	Sulawesi Utara	15.290	1.991	17.281
21.	Gorontalo	10.157	1.029	11.186
22.	Sulawesi Tengah	34.832	2.772	37.604
23.	Sulawesi Tenggara	22.790	2.515	25.305
24..	Sulawesi Selatan	62.148	5.992	68.140
25.	Bali	15.524	1.223	16.747
26.	NTB	70.374	752	77.902
27.	NTT	69.416	7.293	76.719
28.	Maluku	24.023	1.645	25.668
29.	Maluku Utara	9.249	968	10.217
30.	Irian Jaya	39.983	3.669	43.652
	Total (ton)	1.865.808	195.985	2.061.793

Source : Bulog 2004

However, if studied further, especially in 2002 the number of households receiving RASKIN was lower than the number that should be (KOS and KS-1 Alek). This means that not all poor households (68%) receive RASKIN allocation.

In addition, it was revealed that the amount of rice supplied was larger (2.8%) than allocated. This advantage may be derived from the PKS-BBM program allocation. This can happen, because in the initial allocation, the needs of each target area are prepared by Bulog, but because the needs in the field are soaring, the rice shortage is fulfilled by PKS-BBM.

Compared to 2002, the RASKIN allocation for 2004 (Table 4) shows a decrease of 165 thousand tons. This decline does not mean there has been a decline in the poor population, but the government's budget allocation has not increased while the rice price has increased sharply. For the 2005 fiscal year, the fuel subsidy reduction fund allocated to RASKIN is still being considered, as the audit results of the Financial and Development Supervisory Board (BPK) show that the success rate is only 78.2 percent of the 2003 RASKIN distribution.

## V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR RASKIN ABANDONMENT POLICIES AND THE SOLUTIONS

According to Klitgaard (2002), corruption (abuse) is most prevalent at the local level, mainly in local government. For example, the number of provincial government employees arrested for corruption cases was 3 times the number of central government employees. The change from the centralized system to decentralization allows the shifting of deviations from central to regional. Because of the regional autonomy regulated in Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No.25 of 1999 was merely interpreted as delegation of authority in making administration and budget policy to the regions. The Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (2016) has set up a mechanism for subsidizing poor communities between the central and regional levels.

In relation to RASKIN, fraud will be easy on administrative systems and distribution. This is due to the administrative system of RASKIN (data collection of target households) in fact uses a different concept. The data collection in some regions was done based on the concept of BPS, while in other areas the concept of BKKBN or a combination of BKKBN concept with community consultation.

The use of different concepts and implementation in the target family data will result in different allocations of rice. An area that uses the BKKBN concept combined with community agreements (the number of poorer households is larger), but in practice the area refers to the concept of BPS (the number of poor households was relatively few). This condition results in the misuse of excess rice distributed, where it is a systematic corruption. This can be controlled through monitoring, and system improvements are integrated and comprehensive.

In the 2003 State Budget, the government set a budget for the compensation fund of BBM by IDR 4.4 trillion (IDR 1.3 trillion more than previous funds). This fund was used as compensation for 12 sectors, for example for education (cheap education for 8 million children) of IDR 1.2 trillion, health IDR 600 billion, transportation IDR 190 billion, empowerment of poor people IDR 120 billion and SME field IDR 90 billion. The budget used for all sectors amounted to IDR 2.7 trillion. Thus, there was a difference from the unused or ineffective budget (leakage) in its use. Obviously there is an imbalance between compensation given to some important sectors (only IDR 2.7 trillion), while budgeting amounts to IDR 4,4 trillion.

The limited budget caused the government to decide RASKIN price of IDR 1.250 per kg, while the market price of IDR 3,432 per kg. In addition, RASKIN has prepared as much as 2.21 million tons for 15 million families, distributed for 9.22 million households (BKKBN, 2003), while another 6 million households who have not received RASKIN allocation will receive other humanitarian assistance for health and education. It was done because the price of rice rose by IDR 18 per kg, from IDR 3,414 per kg to IDR 3,432 per kg.

The RASKIN program in 2003 was allegedly abused both at the DOLOG level, as well as in the kelurahan. Type of abuse that occurs among others. First, poor quality of RASKIN (dirty, lots of fleas), so that the recipient community of RASKIN sold it to get the rice with better quality. Second, the wrong target of non-RASKIN beneficiaries was registered as recipients due to local level policies that leveled RASKIN's allotted share. Third, there was an additional charge so that the price of RASKIN per kg becomes more expensive (IDR 1000/kg) than it should be. Fourth, RASKIN's share is sold again to market by the executing officer. Fifth, the number of scales was reduced. Sixth, the existence of delinquent deposits by field officers which resulted in the subsequent quota being impeded. Seventh, mistakes of data submitted. Eighth, lack of coordination from center to level of executor ([www.uplink.urbanpoor.or.id](http://www.uplink.urbanpoor.or.id))

In 2002, RASKIN allocation of 2.35 million tons increased by about 57% compared to the OPK allocation in 2001 of only 1.49 million tons. Actually, the number of poor households that require food aid is still quite high. The BKKBN data collection shows that poor and prosperous families that can be categorized as poor are 14.7 million households. While the government should only provided Raskin aid for 9.79 million households (2002). Therefore, it was necessary to improve the distribution and data collection of target households systematically. This can be done by rearranging every two months and monitoring at the end of its distribution. The occurrence of delinquent payments, need to watch out whether the arrears occur because the target household is in arrears? Or because the officer at one of the distribution chains did not refund the money.

The result of Silaban and Setiawan's research (2013) found that the procurement of food subsidies (raskin) was not fully able to overcome the problem of income gap between household groups in Indonesia and especially to overcome the problem of poverty. Rasyid (2012) states that the program, Raskin has a negative effect on family income because the head of the family reduces working hours. However, according to Sundari and Nachrowi (2015), in general, Raskin was relatively on target. Raskin should be prioritized on female headed households, elementary education, and working in agriculture and non-agriculture.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

RASKIN is one type of social protection from the government for people who are less able to meet basic food needs. This program has changed from its original program, OPM and OPK. Some improvements have been made to reduce the poverty level in Indonesia, but the desired objectives can be said to have not been achieved entirely. The source of the problem is the occurrence of discrepancies between concepts and their implementation.

Abuse of the RASKIN program mainly occurs related to the distribution and determination aspects of the targeted households. In certain areas, funds obtained from RASKIN's sales were not entirely in. (This has an impact on the reduction and even termination of RASKIN at the site). There is even a recipient who is not really a poor family, so there was the possibility of rice being sold again to the market or mixed with other rice. In addition, there was also a society who states that the weight of rice received is reduced between 0.5 to 1 kg per bag (20 kg per sack). Sometimes, if the quality of RASKIN was good enough, it was sold to the market at a price higher than the purchase price (IDR 2,200 per kg), but lower than the market price (IDR 3100 per kg).

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