

The Analysis of Indonesia's Strategic Culture in the North Natuna Sea Issue

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Abstract: This paper provides the analysis of Indonesia's strategic culture in the case of renaming Natuna into North Natuna Sea. Certain international reports and analysis, together with several official document and literatures will be gained to collect some data to give a picture of the analysis focus. The main findings in this analysis explain that domestic constraint through elite political policy, takes diplomatic and political ways to adapt the external environment defensively by renaming EEZ in Natuna becomes North Natuna Sea. The results of this study highlight that offensive way is not inherently taken to adapt the external environment.

KEYWORD: North Natuna Sea, Domestic Constraint, Defensive

I. INTRODUCTION

The South China Sea (SCS) has been one of the tougher litmus tests for Indonesia sovereignty. Even though Indonesia is not a claimant state, Indonesia has great interest in preserving freedom of navigation^[1] and peaceful maritime security (Muhibat and Susanna, 2016: 7). Also, Natuna is a salient territory of Indonesia which is quite busy talked about especially when China's increasingly offensive presence in the South China Sea region. The Natuna area adjacent to the South China Sea makes the area particularly vulnerable, especially when China claims ownership of Natuna, especially Indonesia's EEZ in Natuna, which is also covered by China's Nine Dash-Line. To see and understand what is the essence of Indonesia's reaction in South China Sea through renaming Natuna EEZ becomes North Natuna Sea, is the significant insight to see how military is not always related much the in discussion of threat. What is really interesting to examine is the political step taken by Indonesia in the midst of the development of the South China Sea issue that continues to heat up from conflict situations that are identical with military measures. This paper provides the analysis of Indonesia's strategic culture in the case of renaming Natuna into North Natuna Sea.

II. STRUCTURAL FEATURE OF STRATEGIC CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

What have been much focuses on South China Sea Conflict that many researcher written about the conflict where the allocation of military confront becomes most popular. So, the analysis puts military factor as the main variable to see how a state reacts to international security issue. Perhaps, it is a appropriate time to see the rare case, like Indonesia in facing threat from China in South China Sea issue, where offensive is not the option.

Some strategic thinkers explain that the factor of the international system is a major reflection in formulating the development of doctrine and military power, both offensive and defensive doctrines (see Snyder, 1986, Rosecrance, 1987, Ka Po Ng, 2005). In fact, military power is described as a product related to the national interest of a country (Evera, 1998: 5). The main argument of strategic thinkers explains that policymakers or political elites play an important role in formulating military doctrines that rely on the condition of the international system as a factor that encourages political elites, such as policymakers to view external conditions as an explanatory indicator how military doctrine should be formed. On the other hand, military doctrine reflects the strength of military organizations (Posen, 1984: 14).

In very different way, strategic culture is useful for considering the cultural context of state action (Farrell, 1998: 408). Many scholars credit civilian policymakers with formulating doctrine well-suited to the state's strategic environment. This portrait of the role of civilians and military in choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines (Kier, 1995: 65).

The civilian role as a policymaker in directing the military to be defensive and emphasizing other measures deemed appropriate to the domestic situation. The condition clearly explains that the role and dominance of civilians to determine the direction of response to international developments.

Therefore, in the face of developments outside the threatening country, civilians continue to rely on the military, but not on something offensive. The military presence is precisely directed to defensive. On the other hand, military organizations, clearly, reflect civil decisions to act.

Operationally, it can be seen through, first, military is rarely a carefully calculated response to the external environment. Instead, civilian policymakers have beliefs about the military's role in society, and these beliefs guide civilian decisions about the organizational form of the military. Civilian decision-makers must first address their concerns about the domestic distribution of power before they consider international incentives. These civilian decisions affect later doctrinal developments. Second, military organizations do not inherently prefer offensive doctrines: their preferences cannot be deduced from functional characteristics and generalized across all military organizations. Military organizations differ in how they view their world and the proper conduct of their mission (Kier, 1995: 66).

Issues outside the country that need to be responded to, not merely rely on the military to be offensive. The main problem lies in the step of responding to external conditions by looking at steps other than the military, to act.

Independent exigencies such as the distribution of power, geographic factors, or technological discoveries are important, but culture is not simply derivative of functional demands or structural imperatives (Kier, 1995: 67).

"Military culture" does not mean military mind; it does not refer to a general set of values and attitudes that all militaries share. The military's culture may reflect some aspects of the civilian society's culture (Kier, 1995: 70-71). In other words, the military's point of view does not mean confrontational, the essence of military culture lies in attempting to confront threats, but not necessarily offensive. Military culture continues to evolve even though the measures taken are not related to the military, but still put forward other efforts in dealing with the external environment. The condition was due to domestic developments that made it impossible to develop offensive capabilities.

Domestic politics set constraints; the military's culture interprets these constraints; the organizational culture is the intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine. civilians have sought for centuries to avoid the creation of an efficient and centralized army that could threaten parliamentary sovereignty (Kier, 1995: 68). There must be some change in the external environment of the organization-primarily as a result of domestic politics-to react (Kier, 1995: 71).

State reaction through policy will always be directed to the external environment. However, it is merely to maintain a strategic culture to respond to external conditions that affect the country by not using military "tools", but only in its strategic culture alone.

III. DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

The issue of the South China Sea (SCS) is a matter of conflict with the mobilization of military forces by many countries, especially the big countries of the United States (US) and China. Indonesia as a country that also has interests and geographical position adjacent to the South China Sea feel that the position of Indonesia is in the midst of competition between the two big countries.

Indonesia is indeed avoiding entry into the alliance and will continue in relations with both US and Chinese countries. Indonesia places itself as an important country to maintain regional stability and to facilitate cooperation. With the strengthening of regional institutions, Indonesia hopes to "engage and limit" China and the US (Hart and McRae, 2015: 1).

On the other hand, it is clear that China includes Natuna waters as part of its territorial claims in the LCS. In the nine-dash line or "U" map that became China's geopolitical policy in the South China Sea, it is clear that China draws a red dotted line as a sign of its territory to enter the waters of the Natuna Islands. Precisely, China's nine-dash line map jutted into the northern part of the Natuna Islands, which is close to the Nanshan Islands (Spratly). The red dashed line touches into the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia located in Natuna waters. The entry of ZEE Indonesia in Natuna waters into this "U" map, provides problems for Indonesia's maritime security as well as Indonesian sovereignty.

As is well known that Natuna waters reserve the largest gas reserves in the world. There are approximately 210 trillion cubic feet of untapped gas reserves in this Natuna area. In fact, gas wealth in Natuna is able to provide oil production at a rate of 35,000 barrels per day (Khoury, 2017: 2).

Illegal fishing activities conducted by Chinese fishermen are seen to be more aggressive since China began to publish the map "U" to the UN in 2009. Indonesian navy arrested 75 Chinese fishermen with 8 ships doing illegal fishing activities in ZEE Indonesia Natuna region in June 2009. However, on that occasion the Chinese precisely urged the Indonesian side to free the fishermen and said that the fisherman is innocent. A year later, Indonesia again found two similar events in May and June. However, Indonesia returned to get a less favorable response from China with the act of intimidation which is actually done by the Chinese as the perpetrators of illegal fishing in Natuna. Similarly, in 2012 and 2013, which in both of these years Indonesia again catch the Chinese fishermen with a response in the form of provocative actions from China. Then, by 2015 the Chinese coast guard is trying to dispel the Indonesian government's efforts to catch identified Chinese fishermen doing illegal fishing in Natuna (Weatherbee, 2016: 2-3).

The loss suffered by Indonesia is not solely on the wealth of the sea, in this case caused by the illegal fishing of China, but more than that, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which became the illegal fishing area of Chinese fishermen as well as the territory of Indonesian sovereignty. Pursuant to UNCLOS 1982, Natuna waters territory is a sovereign territory of Indonesia which is 200 miles from the mainland. This confirms that the waters or EEZ in Natuna are absolutely owned by Indonesia. On the other hand, China's attitude is not based on the provisions of international law that make the country's claims weak. This condition, theoretically, is a violation of sovereignty, especially the escort of China's coast guard against its fishermen in fishing in Natuna waters is considered harassing Indonesian sovereignty.

The issue, should be addressed by Indonesia by putting forward the military power to, offensive, face the violation of China's sovereignty. The development of SCS concerning Indonesian sovereignty needs to be responded by the deployment of maritime forces.

But, Indonesia is still militarily and economically a weak state, in particular compared to some of its neighbors. Yet it enjoys comparable or even greater regional leadership and clout than any of the other emerging powers in the developing world. For a country that is neither the strongest military nor economic power even in its own immediate region, (even tiny Singapore scores better on both counts), Indonesia has done more as a mediator and facilitator of Asian conflicts than the region's major powers – China, Japan and India–combined (Acharya, 2014).

Another fundamental issue is that Indonesia has deepened its bilateral relationship with China in recent times for its pragmatic interests. This is driven by the rise in China's economy and China's prospects of increasing prosperity and serving the interests of Indonesia in securing foreign investment and increasing exports. Therefore, it is only natural that Indonesia's foreign policy in policy formation also tends to be more cautious about China than the US.

This issue concerns Indonesia's domestic economic problems, but on the other hand, there are situations that are unfavorable to Indonesia if Indonesia missteps and can impact on Indonesia's relationships that must confront these two major countries, but on the other hand there are opportunities that Indonesia should see and use it to provide economic, political and

security benefits. That way, Indonesia is not in a tight spot between the US and China but rather sees the opportunity of competition and conflict between the two countries in SCS issue.

Indonesia's defensive response to China's drawbacks on military options or offensive measures is not an option in Joko Widodo (Jokowi) government. Interestingly, Indonesia's response in the face of violation of sovereignty in Natuna by China through the claim of Nine Dash-Line and illegal fishing is addressed politically. This explains the role of civilians in formulating policies related to the threat of sovereignty, not leading to the settlement of the issue by military means.

This condition emphasizes the policy of the political elite as a domestic constraint to direct military power. Domestic constraint that developed in the formulation of Indonesian policy, related to the issue of Natuna lies in the Policy of World Maritime Fulcrum which is the main agenda of Jokowi's government.

Through the policy of the World Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia's archipelagic-oriented foreign policy focus is oriented on five key areas: (i) "maritime diplomacy" to promote the settlement of state border disputes; (ii) maintaining the integrity of territorial state, maritime sovereignty, safety and social welfare in the outermost islands; (iii) maintaining national resources and exclusive economic zones (EEZ); (iv) intensified defense diplomacy; and (v) reduce maritime competition between the major powers and promote peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in the region (Gindarsah, 2015: 2-3).

From these domestic developments, it appears that the dispute resolution process is carried out in peaceful ways. Peaceful steps aimed at policy to implement strategic policies adapted to domestic conditions.

As a strategic tool, the policy needs to be built in diplomatic efforts that can provide a form of bilateral and regional friendships to dampen the escalation of conflict as well as to place Indonesia as an archipelago that has a major contribution to mediate potential conflicts, not by escalating conflict escalation. This is in line with the focus of Indonesia's domestic conditions that promote peaceful means

The policy adopted by Indonesia in facing the threat of sovereignty in Natuna through the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs is located in the north of Natuna Islands, Riau Islands Province, as the North Natuna Sea. The name changes in the waters north of Natuna has been through a series of planning and processes since 2016 ago. The name of the altered waters is only those that fall within the territory of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia.

Therefore, the protection of ZEE's sovereignty and marine resources in the Indonesian border region of Natuna is the main reason. Indonesia's geopolitical step through the change of name to North Natuna Sea as well as renewing the map of Indonesian territory that has not been updated since 2005, became a brilliant geopolitical strategy in protecting the territorial sovereignty and marine resources without triggering military confrontation.

The geopolitical step is undertaken by Indonesia through the official announcement of North Natuna Names in accordance with the standards set by the International Hydrographic Organization and the provisions of the Electronic Navigational Chart, which affirms Indonesia's sovereignty.

The move explains Indonesia's strategic culture as a country in the escalation of conflict between the two major countries, as well as calculations of economic and security interests, as well as domestic conditions leading to defensive policies. This issue reflects Indonesia's strategic culture to be proactive towards peace while securing the interests of sovereignty not by confrontational measures.

It was also seen from the slow response from Indonesia in the mobilization of military power. It can be said that the deployment of military power is only an alternative considering the political step through diplomacy has been carried out.

After the change of name Natuna becomes North Natuna Sea, Indonesia does the mobilization of military force in Natuna region. Military base in Natuna will be equipped with three warships Navy, submarine, one fighter, radar, and air defense drone attack. The harbor in Natuna will also be repaired, while the runway is widened for landing aircraft (Gumilang, 2016).

Indonesia's response through the deployment of military power is not a late response even though new military forces are emerging. Domestic conditions that guide the peaceful and economic problems of Indonesia towards China, are the factors that push the political elite not to take confrontational steps, but by continuing to advance the process of resolution of the threat of sovereignty.

By renaming the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia reflects external conditions by making domestic conditions as a variable affecting elite policy without being confrontational or offensive. This explains Indonesia's strategic culture in the face of the development of the external environment in the South China Sea where domestic constraints becomes variables that affect Indonesia's defensive attitude.

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